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This article identifies a series of specific questions that reporters can ask 
about claims made by developers of automated motor vehicles (“AVs”).1 Its 
immediate intent is to facilitate more critical, credible, and ultimately 
constructive reporting on progress toward automated driving. In turn, 
reporting of this kind advances three additional goals. First, it encourages 
AV developers to qualify and support their public claims. Second, it 
appropriately manages public expectations about these vehicles. Third, it 
fosters more technical accuracy and technological circumspection in legal 
and policy scholarship. 
This third purpose goes to the core of this interdisciplinary journal. Legal 
and policy scholarship about emerging technologies often relies at least in 
part on popular reporting. On one hand, this reporting can provide timely and 
accessible insights into these technologies, particularly when the scientific 
literature cannot. On the other hand, this reporting can reflect misconceptions 
based on incomplete information supplied by self-interested developers—
misconceptions that are then entrenched through legal citation. For example, 
I have pushed back against claims that automated driving will be a panacea,2 
 
 1. These questions first appeared in Questions to Ask About AV Announcements, 
LAW OF THE NEWLY POSSIBLE, www.newlypossible.org/wiki/index.php?title=Questions 
_ to_ Ask_About_AV_Announcements (last updated Oct. 14, 2019). This article updates 
and explains them. 
 2. See Bryant Walker Smith, How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, 
47 N.M. L. REV. 99 (2017); Bryant Walker Smith, Managing Autonomous 
Transportation Demand, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1401 (2012). 
2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND MOBILITY 2020 
that its technical challenges have long been “solved,”3 and that nontechnical 
issues involving regulation, liability, popularity, and philosophy are 
therefore the paramount obstacles to deployment.4 
Common to many of these misconceptions is the question of whether 
automated driving is finally here. AVs were 20 years away from the late 
1930s until the early 2010s and have been about five years away ever since. 
This is clearly a long history of misplaced optimism, but more recent 
predictions, while still moving targets, are now proximate enough to 
realistically drive decisions about investment, planning, and production. 
Indeed, of the companies that claim to be even closer, some really are—at 
least to automated driving of some kind. 
The “what” of these predictions matters as much as the “when,” and the 
leading definitions document for automated driving—SAE J3016—is 
helpful for understanding this what.5 The figure below offers a gloss on these 
definitions, including the widely (mis)referenced levels of driving 
automation. No developer has credibly promised level 5 (full automation) 
anytime soon. But many are working toward various applications of level 4 
(high automation), which could, depending on their implementation, include 
everything from low-speed shuttles and delivery robots to traffic jam 
automation features and automated long-haul trucks. When anything 
approaching level 5 does becomes a reality, it will likely be an afterthought 
in a world that has already been revolutionized in a hundred other ways. 
 
 3. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1, (2017); Bryant Walker Smith, A Legal Perspective on Three 
Misconceptions in Vehicle Automation, in LECTURE NOTES IN MOBILITY: ROAD VEHICLE 
AUTOMATION 85 (Gereon Meyer & Sven Beiker eds., 2014). 
 4. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United 
States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014); Bryant Walker Smith, supra note 3 (discussing 
product liability); Bryant Walker Smith, The Trolley and the Pinto: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
in Automated Driving and Other Cyber-Physical Systems, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 197 
(2017). 
 5. SAE INT’L, J3016, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO 
DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES (last updated June 15, 
2018), https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_201806 [hereinafter SAE J3016]. 
The term “automated vehicle” deviates slightly from SAE J3016 but is nonetheless 
widely accepted. See, e.g., U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., RESOLUTION ON THE 
DEPLOYMENT OF HIGHLY AND FULLY AUTOMATED VEHICLES IN ROAD TRAFFIC (Oct. 
2019), unece.org/trans/resources/publications/transwp1publications/2019/resolution-
on-the-deployment-of-highly-and-fully-automated-vehicles-in-road-traffic/doc.html; U. 
S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., USDOT AUTOMATED VEHICLES ACTIVITIES (last updated Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.transportation.gov/AV; Final Act, With Comments: Uniform 
Automated Operation of Vehicles Act (2019), https://www.uniformlaws.org 
/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a78d1ab0-
fac8-9ea1-d8f2-a77612050e6e&forceDialog=0. However, the levels of automation 
generally describe features on vehicles rather than the vehicles themselves. See SAE 
J3016. 
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Figure: A Gloss on SAE J30166 
 
Your role in driving automation 
 
Driving involves paying attention to the vehicle, the road, and the 
environment so that you can steer, brake, and accelerate as needed. If 
you’re expected to pay attention, you’re still driving -- even when a 
vehicle feature is assisting you with steering, braking, and/or accelerating. 
(Driving may have an even broader legal meaning.) 
 
Types of trips 
A. You must drive for the entire trip 
B. You will need to drive if prompted in order to maintain safety 
C. You will need to drive if prompted in order to reach your 
destination 
D. You will not need to drive for any reason, but you may drive if you 
want 
E. You will not need to drive for any reason, and you may not drive 
 
Types of vehicles 
A. Vehicles you can drive 
B. Vehicles you can’t drive 
 
Types of vehicle features 
 
These are the levels of driving automation. They describe features in 
vehicles rather than the vehicles themselves. This is because a vehicle’s 
feature or features may not always be engaged or even available. 
 
The operational design domain (“ODD”) describes when and where a 
feature is specifically designed to function. For example, one feature may 
be designed for freeway traffic jams, while another may be designed for a 
particular neighborhood in good weather. 
 
By describing a feature’s level of automation and operational design 




 6. This first appeared at Automated Driving Definitions, LAW OF THE NEWLY 
POSSIBLE, http://newlypossible.org/wiki/index.php?title=Automated_Driving_Definitio 
ns (last updated Aug. 1, 2018). 
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Assisted driving features 
 
L0: You’re driving 
 
L1: You’re driving, but you’re assisted with either steering or speed 
 
L2: You’re driving, but you’re assisted with both steering and speed 
 
Automated driving features 
 
L3: You’re not driving, but you will need to drive if prompted in order to 
maintain safety 
 
L4: You’re not driving, but either 
a) you will need to drive if prompted in order to reach your destination (in 
a vehicle you can drive) or 
b) you will not be able to reach every destination (in a vehicle you can’t 
drive) 
 
L5: You’re not driving, and you can reach any destination 
 
As the following questions for reporters make clear, automated driving is 
much more than just a level of automation. The questions, which fall into 
five overlapping categories (human monitoring, technical definitions, 
deployment, safety, and reevaluation), are: 
 
1. Human monitoring 
1.1. Is a person monitoring the AV from inside the vehicle? Why? Are 
they always paying attention? How can they intervene? How often do they 
intervene? How are they supervised? 
 
1.2. Is a person monitoring the AV from outside the vehicle? Why? Are 
they always paying attention? How can they intervene? How often do they 
intervene? How are they supervised? 
 
1.3. Is a person monitoring the AV from a remote center? Why? Are they 
always paying attention? How can they intervene? How often do they 
intervene? How are they supervised? 
 
1.4. What are specific examples of difficult scenarios in which a person 
did not intervene? In which a person unnecessarily intervened? In which 
a person necessarily intervened? What form did this intervention take? 
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1.5. At any moment, what is the ratio between the number of people who 
are monitoring and the number of AVs that are deployed? 
 
2. Technical definitions 
2.1. What level of automation corresponds to the design intent for the AV? 
What level of automation corresponds to how the AV is actually being 
operated? 
 
2.2. In what environment is the AV operating? On roads open to other 
motor vehicles? To bicyclists? To pedestrians? 
 
2.3. What infrastructure, if any, has been changed or added to support the 
AV in this environment? 
 
2.4. If the AV perceives that its path is obstructed, what does it do? For 
example, does it wait for the obstruction to clear, wait for a person to 
intervene, or plan and follow a new path? 
 
3. Deployment 
3.1. What is the AV’s deployment timeline? For how long will it be 
deployed? Is this a temporary or permanent service? 
 
3.2. Who can buy the AV or its automated driving feature? Under what 
conditions? 
 
3.3. Who can ride in, receive products or services from, or otherwise use 
the AV? Under what conditions? 
 
3.4. As part of the deployment, who is paying whom? For what? 
 
3.5. What promises or commitments has the developer of the AV made to 
governments and other project partners? 
 
3.6. What previous promises, commitments, and announcements has the 
developer made about their AVs? Have they met them? Do they still stand 
by them? What has changed, and what have they learned? Why should we 
believe them now? 
 
4. Safety 
4.1. Why do the developer of the AV and any companies or governments 
involved in its deployment think that the deployment is reasonably safe? 
Why should we believe them? 
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4.2. What will the developer of the AV and any companies or 




5.1. Might the answers to any of these questions change during the 
deployment of the AV? How and why? What will trigger that change? 
 
The remainder of this article explores these questions with a view toward 
assessing the reality behind a given automated driving announcement or 
activity. To this end, it is important to understand that a vehicle that requires 
an attentive safety driver is not truly an automated vehicle. Aspirational, yes. 
But actual, no. This point underlies many of the questions that follow. 
HUMAN MONITORING 
Is a person monitoring the AV from inside the vehicle? Why? Are they 
always paying attention? How can they intervene? How often do they 
intervene? How are they supervised? 
Imagine that as you are boarding a plane, the captain announces that “I’ll 
be using autopilot today. We’ll be pushing off shortly. Have a nice flight.” 
How do you feel? 
Now imagine that the captain instead announces that “You’ll be using 
autopilot today, because I’m getting off. You’ll be pushing off shortly. Have 
a nice flight.” How do you feel now? 
Just as there is a significant difference between these two scenarios, 
automated driving under the supervision of a safety driver is not the same as 
automated driving without this supervision. Yet news headlines, ledes, and 
even entire articles often describe only “driverless” vehicles—even when 
those vehicles are supervised by at least one trained safety driver who is 
physically present for every trip. 
This confusion has consequences. Casual readers (and even reporters) may 
believe that an automated driving project is far more technically advanced or 
economically feasible than it really is. They may therefore be more likely to 
look for nontechnical explanations for the seemingly slow rollout of 
automated vehicles. Ironically, they may also discount truly significant 
news, such as Waymo’s recent decision to remove safety drivers from some 
of its vehicles.7 
Reporters should therefore ask whether an automated vehicle is being 
 
 7. Dan Chu, Waymo One: A year of firsts, WAYMO, (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://blog.waymo.com/2019/12/waymo-one-year-of-firsts.html. 
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operated with or without a safety driver inside it, and they should include the 
answer to this question in the first rather than the final paragraph of their 
stories. Related questions can then provide further context. Is the safety 
driver seated in the traditional driver’s seat (if there is one) or elsewhere in 
the vehicle? Can they immediately brake, steer, and accelerate the vehicle? 
And, in the interest of safety, how are they supervised? As Uber’s 2018 fatal 
crash tragically demonstrated, a system’s machine and human elements can 
both be fallible.8 
For the most part, an AV developer that uses safety drivers is not yet 
confident that its vehicles can reliably achieve an acceptable level of safety 
on their own. This is still true even if a vehicle completes a drive without any 
actual intervention by that safety driver. At least in the United States, 
alternative explanations for retaining the safety driver—to comply with 
ostensible legal requirements, to reassure passengers, or to perform 
nondriving functions—are generally lacking. 
At the same time, AV developers might reach different conclusions about 
the requisite level of safety or the requisite level of confidence in that safety. 
To use a very limited analogy: A rock climber’s rejection of ropes and 
harnesses probably says more about the climber’s confidence than about 
their skill. 
Is a person monitoring the AV from outside the vehicle? Why? Are they 
always paying attention? How can they intervene? How often do they 
intervene? How are they supervised? 
A safety driver might be present near rather than inside a vehicle. For 
example, a demonstration of a small delivery vehicle that is not designed to 
carry people may nonetheless involve a safety driver seated in a car that trails 
the delivery vehicle. Reliance on such a safety driver places a significant 
technical and economic asterisk on claims about the capabilities of these 
delivery vehicles. Because reliance on safety drivers also involves reliance 
on a robust communications system, reliance on them also introduces an 
additional issue of safety. 
Tesla’s recent introduction of its Smart Summon feature also shows why 
unoccupied does not necessarily mean driverless.9 This feature does not 
reach the threshold for automated driving—and certainly not “full self-
 
 8. In short: Both the design and the driver were lax on the assumption that the other 
would not be. Cf. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFTEY BD., NTSB - ADOPTED BOARD REPORT HAR-
19/03 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=47 
9021&docketID=62978&mkey=96894 (describing the factors that contributed to the 
crash). 
 9. Introducing Software Version 10.0, TESLA BLOG (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.tesla.com/blog/introducing-software-version-10-0. 
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driving”—because it is designed with the expectation that there will be a 
human driver who will supervise the vehicle from the outside and intervene 
to prevent harm. Emphasizing that the user is still a driver may help to temper 
claims and assumptions that could lead to the dangerous misuse of this driver 
assistance feature. 
Is a person monitoring the AV from a remote center? Why? Are they 
always paying attention? How can they intervene? How often do they 
intervene? How are they supervised? 
For years, one of the more contentious issues in the automated driving 
community has involved what might be neutrally termed “remote facilitation 
of the driving task.” This phrase encompasses a broad spectrum of potential 
roles performed by actors outside the vehicle—roles that are important to 
understanding the technical and safety claims made by developers of 
automotive technologies. 
On one side of the spectrum lies remote driving, in which a human driver 
who may be many miles away from a vehicle uses a communications system 
to perceive the vehicle’s driving environment and to steer, accelerate, and 
brake in real time—what SAE J3016 calls “performance of the dynamic 
driving task.”10 This remote driving is orthogonal to automated driving (in 
other words, neither its synonym nor its antonym). Indeed, some automated 
driving developers skeptical of remote driving are eager to differentiate the 
two in both language and law. 
On the other side of the spectrum lies network monitoring. An automated 
driving company might maintain a facility in which human agents 
collectively monitor its AVs, communicate with the users of those vehicles, 
and coordinate with emergency responders. While stressing that their human 
agents are not performing the dynamic driving task, some AV developers 
have been vague about what specifically these agents are and are otherwise 
not doing. 
Journalists, however, can be concrete in their questioning. They can ask 
whether there is a remote person assigned to or available for each vehicle, 
what that person does during the vehicle’s normal operation, and what that 
person does in less common situations. For example, imagine that an AV 
approaches a crash scene and concludes that it cannot confidently navigate 
by itself. What role might a remote agent play? Might this person give the 
vehicle permission to proceed? Might they manually identify roadway 
objects that the AV could not confidently classify? Might they sketch a rough 
travel path for the AV to follow if the AV agrees? Might they direct the AV 
to follow the path even if the AV would otherwise reject it? Or might they 
 
 10. SAE J3016, supra note 5. 
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actually relay specific steering, accelerating, and braking commands to the 
AV? 
How a company answers these questions can provide insight into the 
maturity of its automated driving program. If the company uses physically 
present safety drivers in its deployments (as most still do), then these 
questions are largely speculative. But if the company plans to remove these 
safety drivers, then it should have careful and concrete answers. And if the 
company declines to share these answers, one might reasonably inquire why. 
What are specific examples of difficult scenarios in which a person did not 
intervene? In which a person unnecessarily intervened? In which a person 
necessarily intervened? What form did this intervention take? 
While anecdotes alone are not enough to establish reasonable safety, they 
can be helpful in measuring progress. An automated driving developer that 
has been testing its vehicles will have stories about unusual situations that 
those vehicles (and their safety drivers) encountered. Many of these 
developers may be happy to share situations that the automated vehicle 
handled or could have handled without intervention. But pairing these with 
situations in which human intervention was necessary provides important 
context. And a company’s willingness to share these more challenging 
stories demonstrates its trustworthiness. 
At any moment, what is the ratio between the number of people who are 
monitoring and the number of AVs that are deployed? 
Economic feasibility offers another metric for automated driving—and 
one that is intertwined with technical feasibility. Economically, automated 
driving is both attractive and controversial in large part because, true to its 
name, it promises to reduce the need for human drivers. Asking whether this 
is in fact happening—that is, whether the ratio of human monitors to 
automated vehicles is less than 1.0—is another way to assess the technical 
progress of an automated driving program. 
This may be especially helpful with respect to pilot projects involving 
specialized vehicles traveling at low speeds in limited areas such as airports, 
downtowns, and shopping malls. There have been and will likely continue 
to be numerous announcements about these projects across the country. But 
so long as these vehicles are deployed with at least one safety driver on 
board, their economic viability is unclear. After all, their hosts could have 
achieved (and could still achieve) the same functional benefits by simply 
deploying conventional fleets. 
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TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS 
What level of automation corresponds to the design intent for the AV? 
What level of automation corresponds to how the AV is actually being 
operated? 
Automated driving developers are almost certainly familiar, though not 
necessarily proficient, with the levels of driving automation defined in SAE 
J3016. They may even reference these levels in their announcements—
correctly or not. Understanding the levels may help to assess the claims. 
Most automated driving development is focused on levels 3 and 4. On one 
side, levels 0, 1, and 2 are in fact driver assistance rather than automated 
driving, and a credible developer should not suggest otherwise. After all, 
features at these levels only work unless and until they don’t, which is why 
a human driver is still needed to supervise them. On the other side, level 5 
describes a feature that can operate everywhere that humans can drive today. 
But while this is the hope of many automated driving developers, it remains 
a distant one. 
A confusing quirk in the levels of automation is the difference between 
what I call an aspirational level and what I call a functional level. The 
aspirational level describes what an automated driving developer hopes its 
system can achieve, whereas the functional level describes what the 
automated driving developer assumes its system can currently achieve. For 
example, most developers of low-speed automated shuttles envision level 4 
automated driving, which would not require a human driver for safe 
operation. But most of these developers still keep their systems under the 
supervision of human safety drivers who are expected to pay attention, which 
corresponds to level 2 rather than level 4. Nonetheless, because SAE J3016 
focuses on design intent, developers of these systems correctly characterize 
them as level 4 (the aspirational level) rather than level 2 (the functional 
level).11 
Similarly, California’s Department of Motor Vehicles considers 
automated vehicles that are merely being tested to be “autonomous” even 
though their safe operation still requires a human safety driver.12 Otherwise, 
rules requiring a safety driver absent specific permission otherwise would 
 
 11. SAE J3016, supra note 5 (explaining the developer of a feature determines its 
level of automation). 
 12. C.f., Key Autonomous Vehicle Definitions, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 
OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/def 
initions (last visited March 9, 2020) (The California DMV defines an “autonomous test 
vehicle” as “a vehicle that has been equipped with technology that is a combination of 
both hardware and software that, when engaged, performs the dynamic driving task, but 
requires a human test driver or a remote operator to continuously supervise the vehicle’s 
performance of the dynamic driving task.”). 
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apply to a null set. Because of this interpretation, companies that are testing 
or deploying automated driving features in California must comply with 
these rules, while companies that are testing or deploying mere driver 
assistance features need not. This is why Uber needed permission to test its 
automated vehicles in California, but Tesla did not need permission to make 
its Autopilot or Smart Summon driver assistance features available in that 
state.13 Yet, as these examples suggest, testing an automated driving feature 
is in many ways technically indistinguishable from using a driver assistance 
feature. 
Asking about the aspirational level of automation invites a company to 
make a public characterization that has marketing and regulatory 
implications. And asking about the functional level of automation invites a 
company to temper its aspirations with the current limitations of its 
technologies. 
References to the levels of automation may be helpful in discussions with 
companies but are generally not necessary or even helpful when reporting to 
the public. Instead, key phrases can more clearly communicate the current 
state of a given technology. Three of the most important are: 
 “A driver assistance feature that still requires a human driver to pay 
attention to the road” (levels 1 and 2) 
 “A vehicle that is designed to drive itself but needs a safety driver 
until it can reliably do so” (aspirational level 4) 
 “A vehicle that drives itself without the need for a safety driver” 
(functional level 4) 
In what environment is the AV operating? On roads open to other motor 
vehicles? To bicyclists? To pedestrians? 
Automated vehicles have been a reality for decades: They are called 
elevators, escalators, people movers, and automated trains. But whereas 
these vehicles operate in highly controlled environments, automated motor 
vehicles are particularly challenging in large part because the driving 
environments they will face are so challenging. 
Below level 5, however, these driving conditions are limited. SAE J3016 
terms these driving conditions the operational design domain,14 and this 
ODD is essential to defining an AV’s capabilities. For example, some 
 
 13. This was understandably frustrating for Uber. See Anthony Levondowski, 
Statement on Self-Driving in San Francisco, (Dec. 17, 2016) (transcript available at Uber 
Newsroom). But see Bryant Walker Smith, Uber vs. the Law, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET 
AND SOCIETY: BLOG (Dec. 17, 2016), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/12/uber-
vs-law. 
 14. See SAE J3016, supra note 5. 
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automated driving features may operate only on freeways, and some AVs 
may be restricted to certain low-speed routes within certain neighborhoods. 
Indeed, early automation activities are generally characterized by some 
combination of slow speeds, simple environments, and supervised 
operations. 
Developers should be upfront about these limitations in their 
announcements—and if they are not, reporters should ask whether and how 
the AVs mix with other road users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and 
conventional drivers. There is a big difference, for example, between 
deploying in complex mixed traffic and deploying on a dedicated route with 
no other traffic. 
As an aside: State vehicle codes apply to public roads, and they may also 
apply to private facilities such as parking garages and private roads that are 
nonetheless open to the public.15 For this reason, AVs that are deployed only 
in privately controlled areas may still have to comply with state laws 
generally applicable to motor vehicles as well as state laws specific to AVs. 
Similarly, these laws may (or may not) also apply to delivery robots that 
travel on sidewalks and crosswalks.16 Developers that suggest otherwise can 
be asked to explain the basis for their legal conclusion. 
What infrastructure, if any, has been changed or added to support the AV 
in this environment? 
Many AV announcements involve specific tests, pilots, or demonstrations 
that may or may not be easily replicated in another location and scaled to 
many more locations. An AV that can accept today’s roads as they are—
inconsistently designed, marked, maintained, and operated—will be much 
easier to scale than one that requires the addition or standardization of 
physical infrastructure. Even if they would be beneficial and practical, 
infrastructure changes are nonetheless important considerations in 
evaluating scalability. For this reason, automated driving developers should 
be asked to identify them. 
If the AV perceives that its path is obstructed, what does it do? For 
 
 15. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1100(a) (McKinney 2019) (“The provisions 
of this title apply upon public highways, private roads open to public motor vehicle traffic 
and any other parking lot, except where a different place is specifically referred to in a 
given section.”). 
 16. E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 144 (McKinney 2019) (“Sidewalk. That portion 
of a street between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent 
property lines, intended for the use of pedestrians.”); id. at 159 (McKinney 2019) 
(“Vehicle. Every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power or used 
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.”). 
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example, does it wait for the obstruction to clear, wait for a person to 
intervene, or plan and follow a new path? 
Even infrastructure that is well maintained will still present surprises, and 
how an AV is designed to deal with these surprises provides some insight 
into its sophistication. Many early automated vehicles would simply stop and 
wait if a pedestrian stepped into their path (or a drop of rain confused their 
sensors). Even today, many AVs rely on frequent human intervention of 
some kind. This question accordingly invites a developer to describe the true 
capabilities of its system. 
DEPLOYMENT 
What is the AV’s deployment timeline? For how long will it be deployed? Is 
this a temporary or permanent service? 
Many recent AV announcements have focused less on technical 
capabilities and more on actual applications, from shuttling real people to 
delivering real products. These specific applications often involve 
partnerships with governments, airports, retailers, shippers, or property 
managers. But it can be unclear whether these applications are one-time 
demonstrations, short-term pilots, or long-term deployments. Querying—
and, in the case of public authorities, requesting records about—the duration 
of these projects helps to understand their significance. 
Who can buy the AV or its automated driving feature? Under what 
conditions? 
There is an important difference between an automated driving developer 
that is marketing its actual system and a developer that is merely marketing 
itself. Yet automated driving announcements tend to conflate actual designs, 
promises of designs, and mere visions of designs. Automakers previewing 
new vehicle features, shuttle developers announcing new collaborations, and 
hardware manufacturers touting new breakthroughs all invite the question, 
“Can I actually buy this vehicle now?” 
Who can ride in, receive products or services from, or otherwise use the 
AV? Under what conditions? 
This same logic applies to announcements about services that purportedly 
involve automated driving. The launch of an automated pizza delivery 
service open to everyone in a city is much more significant than the staged 
delivery of a single pizza by a single AV. So too with the automation of long-
haul shipping, low-speed shuttles, and taxis. Services that at least part of the 
public can actually and regularly use are far more significant than one-off 
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demonstrations. 
As part of the deployment, who is paying whom? For what? 
For the reasons already discussed, the economics of early deployments can 
be hazy. Why are automated shuttles, each with its own safety driver, more 
cost-effective than conventional shuttles? Why are automated trucks, each 
with its own safety driver, more cost-effective than conventional trucks? The 
financial arrangements with project partners—especially public authorities 
subject to open records laws—can offer some insight into whether these 
early deployments provide tangible benefits or are instead largely 
exploratory or promotional. 
What promises or commitments has the developer of the AV made to 
governments and other project partners? 
When project partners are involved for long-term rather than near-term 
benefit, it can be helpful to query their expectations. Imagine, for example, 
that an airport or retirement community announces its intent to host 
automated shuttles that are supervised by safety drivers. When has the 
developer of these shuttles suggested or promised that safety drivers will no 
longer be necessary? And who bears the cost of paying these drivers in the 
interim? 
What previous promises, commitments, and announcements has the 
developer made about their AVs? Have they met them? Do they still stand 
by them? What has changed, and what have they learned? Why should we 
believe them now? 
Because innovation is unpredictable, claims about deployment timelines 
may turn out to be incorrect even if they are made in good faith. However, 
the companies (or people) responsible for these claims should acknowledge 
that they were wrong, explain why, and temper their new claims accordingly. 
Reporters should demand this context from their subjects and report it to their 
audience. Of course, a commercial emphasis on speed and controversy can 
make this especially challenging, in which case the headline “Company X 
makes another claim” could at least be used for the more egregious 
offenders. 
SAFETY 
Why do the developer of the AV and any companies or governments 
involved in its deployment think that the deployment is reasonably safe? 
Why should we believe them? 
While the broader topic of AV safety is beyond the scope of this article, it 
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should occupy a prominent place in any automated driving announcement. 
For years, I have encouraged companies that are developing new 
technologies to publicly share their safety philosophies—in other words, to 
explain what they are doing, why they think it is reasonably safe, and why 
we should believe them. Journalists can pose these same questions and push 
for concrete answers. 
The phrasing of these questions matters. For example, a company might 
explain that its AV testing is reasonably safe because it uses safety drivers. 
But it should also go further by explaining why it believes that the presence 
of safety drivers is sufficient for reasonable safety. Conversely, if a company 
does not use safety drivers, it should explain why it believes that they are not 
necessary for reasonable safety. And in answering these questions, the 
company may also have to detail its own view of what reasonable safety 
means. 
In this regard, it is important to recognize that safety is not just a single 
test. Instead, it includes a wide range of considerations over the entire 
product lifecycle, including management philosophy, design philosophy, 
hiring and supervision, standards integration, technological monitoring and 
updating, communication and disclosure, and even strategies for managing 
inevitable technological obsolescence. In this way, safety is a marriage rather 
than just a wedding: a lifelong commitment rather than a one-time event. 
What will the developer of the AV and any companies or governments 
involved in its deployment do in the event of a crash or other incident? 
Safety is not absolute. Indeed, just because an AV is involved in a crash 
does not mean that the vehicle is unsafe. Regardless, an AV developer should 
have a “break-the-glass” plan to document its preparation for and guide its 
response to incidents involving its AVs. (So too should governments.) How 
will it recognize and manage a crash? How will it coordinate with first 
responders and investigators? A developer that has such a plan—and is 
willing to discuss the safety-relevant portions of it—signals that it 
understands that deployment is about more than just the state of the 
technologies. 
REEVALUATION 
Might the answers to any of these questions change during the deployment 
of the AV? How and why? What will trigger that change? 
This article ends where it began: Automated driving is complex, dynamic, 
and difficult to predict. For these reasons, many of an AV developer’s 
answers to the questions identified here could evolve over the course of a 
deployment. On one hand, the realties of testing or deployment may demand 
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a more cautious approach or frustrate the fulfilment of some promises. On 
the other hand, developers still hope to remove their safety drivers and to 
expand their operational design domain at some point. How—and on what 
basis—will they decide when to take these steps? Their answers can help to 
shift discussions from vague and speculative predictions to meaningful and 
credible roadmaps. 
